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FORUM OVER SUBSTANCE:
CORNELIUS v. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCA TION FUND
Money may be the root of all evil, but it can also be the source of a great
deal of good when given to charity.' Thousands of organizations rely on
charitable contributions to fund their daily activities. The importance of do-
nations to these groups' work is reflected in the tax code2 and in the federal
government's sponsorship of the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC).3 The
CFC is a means of encouraging federal employees to give to charity,4 while
limiting the disturbance in the federal workplace that solicitation by a
number of charities might cause.5 In pursuit of these goals, the federal gov-
ernment has issued regulations which, among other things, limit participa-
tion in the CFC to reputable charitable groups.6
Those standards, as amended by President Reagan through executive or-
ders, 7 would exclude several legal defense funds (LDFs) from the CFC.
Those organizations' legal challenge to enforcement of the regulations even-
tually led to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund.8 There, the Court held that
although the LDFs' solicitation of contributions is speech protected by the
first amendment, 9 the government's justifications for excluding those organi-
1. Luke 21:1-4.
2. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1983).
3. See 5 C.F.R. § 950.105 (1984).
4. 5 C.F.R. § 950.103 (1984).
5. Exec. Order No. 10,728, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1954-1958 Comp.). See Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985). There, the Supreme Court noted that
prior to the establishment of the CFC, solicitation caused disruption in the federal workplace:
Because no systemwide regulations were in place to provide for orderly procedure,
fund-raising frequently consisted of passing an empty coffee can from employee to
employee. Eventually, the increasing number of entities seeking access to federal
buildings and the multiplicity of appeals disrupted the work environment and con-
fused employees who were unfamiliar with the groups seeking contributions.
Id. at 3444 (citations omitted). See also Hearing before the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 67-68 (1983).
6. 5 C.F.R. § 950.103(a) (1984). See generally 5 C.F.R. §§ 950.101-.525 (1984).
7. Exec. Order No. 12,353, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1983); Exec. Order No. 12,404, 3 C.F.R. 151
(1984).
8. 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
9. Id. at 3447. Here the Court followed Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), where a city ordinance restricting solicitation of contribu-
tions to organizations which used 75% of their receipts for charitable purposes was struck
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zations from the campaign were reasonable.t° In so holding, the Court en-
gaged in "forum analysis," a device used to evaluate the constitutionality of
regulating expressive activity on government property" by balancing the
mandates of the first amendment 12 against the government's power to re-
strict the use of its property to its intended purpose. t3 Under forum analy-
sis, the government's power to regulate speech depends largely on the degree
to which that speech would interfere with the use the government intends for
the forum property 4 and the public or nonpublic nature of the property.' 5
This Note will review the Court's earlier decisions that evaluated the con-
stitutionality of a governmental entity's efforts to restrict access or regulate
speech on property an individual sought to use as a first amendment forum.
Further analysis will focus upon the Court's opinion in Cornelius in light of
those cases. Finally, this Note will conclude that in applying forum analysis
in Cornelius, the Court has given the government almost limitless discretion
in applying restrictions on speech in facilities not generally open to the pub-
lic. It has done so by categorizing the forum property by the extent to which
the government had intended to allow access to it. Because the category
imposed dictates the standard of review, and thus, to a great degree, the
result, the Court effectually has predicated the right to expression on govern-
ment property on the government's willingness to allow expression there,
down as overbroad. There, after an extensive review of its prior decisions regarding religious
and charitable solicitations, the Court recognized that:
Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but the
latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is charac-
teristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking sup-
port for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social
issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and
advocacy would likely cease.
Id. at 632. The 75% limitation was found not to promote adequately a government interest
which was sufficiently important to override the free speech interests involved and was there-
fore invalid. Id. at 636.
10. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3447.
11, See Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287
(1979).
12. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. As the Court stated in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 46 (1983), "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." See U.S. Postal Serv.
v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 836 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966).




without considering how a particular expressive activity would affect the
dedicated use of that property.
I. FORUM ANALYSIS: A PLACE FOR EVERYTHING, AND EVERYTHING
IN ITS PLACE
Forum analysis crystallized in the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Perry
Education Assocation v. Perry Local Educators' Assocation. 16 There, the
Court held that the characteristics of a public property may justify restric-
tions on an individual's right of access to that property and that evaluation
of such restrictions varies with the nature of the property.' 7 The Court ex-
plained this relationship by describing three categories of fora for expression:
the traditional public forum, the limited public forum, and the nonpublic
forum. 18
The first of these, traditional public fora, are those places that tradition-
ally have been sites for expressive activity. 19 The government may exclude
speakers from these places because of the content of the speech only when
the regulation is carefully designed to restrict speech no more than necessary
to serve a compelling state interest. 20 The government may regulate the
time, place, and manner of speech in these places, but only so far as is neces-
sary to serve a significant government interest.
2'
The second category of fora, the limited public forum, differs from the
traditional public forum in that it has been created by the government by
16. Id.
17. See id. at 44, where the Court observed, "[t]he existence of a right of access to public
property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ
depending on the character of the property at issue."
18. Id. at 45-46.
19. Id. at 45. These are "places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate .... " Id.
20. Id. The Court held that in these places, "[for the State to enforce a content-based
exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461
(1980)).
Regardless of the forum, the government may punish a speaker for the content of speech, if
the speech "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely do incite
or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
21. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. The Court held that in these fora, "[t]he State may also enforce
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication." Id. (citations omitted).
The significant government interests that may justify these regulations include: "to prevent
confusion by overlapping parades or processions, to secure convenient use of the streets by
other travelers, and to minimize the risk of disorder." Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
576 (1941).
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opening property to the public for expressive activity22 for a limited time2 3
or for a limited purpose.24 As long as the government retains the open char-
acter of the property, the same standards regarding permissible regulations
of speech as are applied in a traditional public forum must apply. Reason-
able time, place, and manner regulations may also be imposed. 25
Different standards of permissible regulation apply to the third category,
the nonpublic fora. These are areas that have not been designated for, or
traditionally used as, a forum for public expression.2 6 The government may
regulate speech in these places as it may in other fora, but it may also make
distinctions between speakers that would not be allowed in other fora, as
long as those distinctions are designed to limit activities to those that are
compatible with the forum's intended purpose.27 Reasonable distinctions
may be made based upon the speaker's status and the subject matter about
which he intends to speak,2 8 provided the distinctions are consistent with the
designated purpose of the forum property and are not made to exclude un-
popular views.2 9
Perry distinguishes the various fora on the basis of the government's ac-
tion in allowing or limiting access to particular property, a distinction which
is valuable as a broad outline of forum analysis. This distinction is mislead-
ing, however, if used as a method of analysis rather than a summary of that
analysis, as it implies that the government may restrict expression in some
places simply because it intends to restrict expression in those places. 30 A
closer look reveals that in the past, the Court has evaluated restrictions on
expressive use of government property by looking at the particular expres-
22. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
23. The government "is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facil-
ity .... " Id. at 46.
24. Use may be limited to certain groups or to discussion of particular subjects. Id. at 46
n.7.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 49. The Court observed:
These distinctions may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and
inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with
the intended purpose of the property. The touchstone for evaluating these distinc-
tions is whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue
serves.
Id.
28. The Court held that "[i]mplicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to
make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. Id.
29. The Court found that "the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. at 46.
30. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983). There, the Court noted that
"Congress ... may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the 'public forum' status of streets and
[Vol. 35:307
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sive activity, by examining the way the particular property is normally used,
and by evaluating the effect of that expression on that use.31 While the facts
of each case undoubtedly complicate this evaluation, the underlying princi-
ple remains quite simple: restrictions on expression are constitutionally per-
missible only to the extent that such restrictions require compatability with
the normal use of the property.32
A. Traditional Fora. Streets and Parks
Before the turn of the century, the Supreme Court did not adhere to the
compatibility principle but allowed the government to use its power as a
property owner largely without restriction. In Davis v. Massachusetts, 33 the
Boston Common was found to be absolutely under the State's control when
a speaker appealed his conviction for violating an ordinance requiring a per-
mit from the mayor prior to making a speech.34 There, the Court found that
because the Common was entrusted to the control of the city by the state,
and the state's power to control the use of its property was equal to that of a
private citizen, the city could regulate its use as it pleased.35
That holding was largely ignored forty-two years later in Hague v. CIO, 
36
where the Court held that the public officials of Jersey City, New Jersey,
parks which have historically been public forums .. " (quoting United States Postal Serv. v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133, (1981)).
Justice Blackmun voiced this same complaint in dissent in Cornelius. See infra notes 185-86
and accompanying text.
31. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981) (discussed infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text), where the Court held that "con-
sideration of a forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation
since the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic
nature and function of the particular forum involved." Id. at 650-51.
32. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). There, the Court observed
that "[tihe crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Id. at 116. See also Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (White, J., concurring).
33. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
34. The ordinance read:
No person shall, in or upon any of the public grounds, make any public address,
discharge any cannon or firearm, expose for sale any goods, wares or merchandise,
erect or maintain any booth, stand, tent or apparatus for the purposes of public
amusement or show, except in accordance with a permit for the mayor.
Id. at 44.
35. The Court held that "[flor the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of
the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house." Id. at 47. Conse-
quently, the Court concluded that Davis had no right "to use the common except in such
mode and subject to such regulations as the legislature in its wisdom may have deemed proper
to prescribe." Id.
36. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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could not flatly deny members of the Committee for Industrial Organization
the right to speak and distribute literature in the streets and parks.17 There
the Court found that regardless of ownership, the streets and parks have
traditionally been used by the public for expressive purposes.3' The ordi-
nance under which the city officials had acted was found to be unconstitu-
tional because its scope was not limited to preserving the normal use of the
streets and parks. 39 Rather, the ordinance allowed city officials to refuse a
permit at their discretion, thus permitting them to suppress expression.'
Two years later, in Cox v. New Hampshire,4 the Court upheld the convic-
tion of several Jehovah's Witnesses for parading without a license through
the streets of Manchester, New Hampshire, thus interfering with normal
sidewalk travel.42 The marchers had not applied for a permit, although they
knew one was required.13 The Court found the licensing ordinance, as con-
strued by the New Hampshire Supreme Court,' to be constitutional, be-
cause it did not vest absolute discretion in the city officials, as in Hague, but
required their efforts to maintain orderly public use of the streets to be sys-
tematic and just.4 5 The Court found the licensing ordinance to be a permis-
37. The CIO also alleged that Jersey City police had made unlawful searches for, and
seizures of, printed matter; had violently interfered with distribution of literature; and had
forced C.I.O. members "to board ferry boats destined for New York." Id. at 501-02.
38. The Court observed that "[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions." Id. at 515.
39. Id. at 516. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (arbitrary refusal of per-
mit to use public park is unconstitutional); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (officials
cannot restrain speech without guidance by appropriate standards, even in a case where the
speaker would likely be restrained by such standards).
40. Hague, 307 U.S. at 516. A state law flatly prohibiting picketing was held invalid in
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), as overly broad. In that case, the picketing was
conducted on private property. Cf Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968) (labor union pickets could not be barred entirely from shopping mall generally open to
the public). But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (limited Logan Valley holding
to picketing relating directly to the use of the shopping center and where no feasible alternative
was available).
41. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
42. Id. at 573.
43. Id.
44. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 16 A.2d 508 (1940). By relying on the State Supreme
Court's interpretation, rather than on the statute as written, the Court gave the state, in effect,
a second chance at writing a permissibly narrow statute. But see Shuttlesworth v. Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), which limited the extent to which a state supreme court could revise
and narrow a statute through interpretation.
45. The Court found "that a 'systematic, consistent and just order of treatment, with
reference to the convenience of public use of the highways, is the statutory mandate.'" Cox,
312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (quoting State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 143, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940)).
[Vol. 35:307
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sible extension of the city's authority to control the use of the streets because
it promoted the legitimate public goal4 6 of ensuring the convenience of all
users.47 The license requirement was found to be important in that effort
because it gave the authorities prior notice so that they could prepare for the
problems that such a march might present.48 Additionally, the Court found
that except for the lack of a license, the parade would have been entirely
permissible under the statute.49
Once again, in Edwards v. South Carolina,50 the Court evaluated a group's
right to parade and assemble. Edwards involved civil rights marchers who
had not violated statutory restrictions on use of the state capitol grounds,
but who were nonetheless ordered to disperse by the police.5' When the
marchers refused and instead engaged in " 'boisterous,' 'loud' and 'flamboy-
ant' conduct,"' 52 they were arrested and convicted for breach of the peace.
46. The Court reiterated:
The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety
and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded
as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the
good order on which they ultimately depend.
Cox, 312 U.S. at 574.
47. Id. at 576.
48. Id. A license fee which could range up to $300 was also upheld as long as the fee was
used only to defray the costs of the parade to the city. Id. at 577. Such a fee was later chal-
lenged in Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978), where an ordinance requiring
parade organizers to obtain at least $300,000 in liability insurance and $50,000 in property
damage insurance prior to a march was found unconstitutional. The court found that the
requirement all but precluded public assemblies due to its prohibitive cost; that the require-
ment was not shown to be necessary; and that some exemptions may have been granted, but
that an absence of standards for exemption allowed the city too much discretion. Such discre-
tion might be used to allow only those demonstrations the message of which the city authori-
ties approved. Id. at 684-86. The city conceded the unconstitutionality of the ordinance, as
applied to the proposed demonstration, on appeal. That limited concession was accepted by
the Court of Appeals, which ruled no further on the issue. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197,
1207-08 (7th Cir. 1978).
49. The Court found:
.. .The [marchers] "had a right, under the Act, to a license to march when, where
and as they did, if after a required investigation it was found that the convenience of
the public in the use of the street would not thereby be unduly disturbed, upon such
conditions or changes in time, place and manner as would avoid disturbance."
Cox, 312 U.S. at 576 (quoting State v. Cox, 91 N.H. at 146, 16 A.2d at 515).
50. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
51. Id. at 236 & n.11.
52. Such conduct included singing the "Star Spangled Banner." Id. at 233. Fourteen
years earlier, the Court upheld a ban on loud and raucous amplified broadcasts on the streets
of Trenton, New Jersey, in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), finding "that the need for
reasonable protection in the homes or business houses from the distracting noises of vehicles
equipped with such sound amplifying devices justifies the ordinance." Id. at 89.
A considerably quieter mode of expression was prohibited by National Park Service regula-
tions in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). Members of
1985]
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The Court held that the statute under which the protestors were convicted
was so broad as to have no bearing upon the control of the proper use of the
state capitol grounds or of the maintenance of order or public safety. 3 The
demonstrators were in fact arrested because of the unpopularity of their
message.54
A similar breach of the peace conviction was dismissed in Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 55 where protestors had gathered across the street from the courthouse
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and had engaged in activity even more boister-
ous than had the defendants in Edwards.56 The Court dismissed the breach
of the peace conviction for the same reasons articulated in Edwards57 and
also dismissed a conviction for obstructing public passages.5" A conviction
CCNV wanted to sleep in symbolic tents in Lafeyette Park, across the street from the White
House in Washington, D.C., to demonstrate the condition of the homeless but could not be-
cause of Park Service restrictions on camping in that area. The Court assumed the sleeping
portion of the demonstration was expressive conduct, id. at 3070, but found that the regulation
prohibiting that expression adequately served "the Government's substantial interest in main-
taining the parks in the heart of our capital in an attractive and intact condition, readily avail-
able to the millions of people who wish to see and enjoy them by their presence," to justify the
restriction. Id. at 3071.
53. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 236-37. The South Carolina Supreme Court had held that the
term breach of the peace, "is not susceptible of exact definition." Id. at 234. See State v.
Edwards, 239 S.C. 339, 343-44, 123 S.E.2d at 249 (1961); see also Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). There the Court found a vagrancy statute "void for vague-
ness, both in the sense that it 'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,' . . . and because it encourages arbitrary
and erratic arrests and convictions." Id. at 162 (citations omitted). See also NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). There the Court found that a statute implicating first amendment
rights may be unconstitutionally overbroad, allowing for improper unconstitutional applica-
tions. The Court noted that for that reason, "in appraising a statute's inhibitory effect upon
[first amendment] rights, this Court has not hesitated to take into account possible applications
of the statute in other factual contexts beside that at bar." Id. at 432.
54. The Court found that "they were convicted upon evidence which showed no more
than that the opinions which they were peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to the
views of the majority of the community to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection."
Edwards, 372 U.S. at 236-37.
55. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
56. The trial court noted:
[I]t must be recognized to be inherently dangerous and a breach of the peace to bring
1,500 people, colored people, down in the predominantly white business district in
the City of Baton Rouge and congregate across the street from the courthouse and
sing songs . . . carrying lines such as "black and white together" and to urge those
1,500 people to descend upon our lunch counters and sit there until they are served.
Id. at 549-50.
57. Id. at 552.
58. That conviction was overturned not because of the relevant statute, which prohibited
all assemblies or parades in the streets, but because the authorities had not applied .the statute




for picketing near a courthouse, based on the same facts, presented different
constitutional problems, requiring a separate opinion.5 9
In that opinion, Justice Goldberg explained that prohibitions on picketing
near courthouses were designed to protect the judicial system, including
judges, jurors and court employees, from undue pressures6" and to exclude
mob influence from the judicial process.6 ' The narrowly drawn Louisiana
statute prohibiting such picketing was held valid on its face, because it regu-
lated conduct in order to further important societal interests.62
The courthouse picketing issue presented in Cox v. Louisiana was brought
again, literally, to the Supreme Court in United States v. Grace.63 In that
case, two demonstrators brought suit challenging enforcement of a federal
law that prohibited the use of banners, flags, and the like in demonstrations
on the grounds of the Supreme Court building.' 4 While on the sidewalk in
front of the building, one protestor had handed out leaflets and another had
displayed a sign bearing the text of the first amendment. The Court avoided
the question of permissible regulation of speech in the building and on the
grounds of the Supreme Court and addressed only the question of regulation
of speech on the sidewalk adjacent to the grounds. 65 The Court found no
justification for regulating the use of those sidewalks any differently from
other city sidewalks. 66 The statutory restrictions on speech on those side-
walks were held unconstitutional because they did not sufficiently promote
the public interest in the preservation of their normal use.6 7
59. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
60. Id. at 561-64.
61. Id. at 562.
62. Id. at 564. The Baton Rouge authorities, however, once again had problems enforcing
a statute. The conviction was overturned on due process grounds because the authorities had
given Cox permission to hold the demonstration on the far side of the street across from the
courthouse and then sought to convict him for demonstrating in that same area. The Court
admonished that "[t]he Due Process Clause does not permit convictions to be obtained under
such circumstances." Id. at 571.
63. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
64. The statute provided: "It shall be unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or
assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner,
or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or move-
ment." 40 U.S.C.A. § 13k (West 1969).
65. 461 U.S. at 178-79.
66. The Court found that "[t]he sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of the Court
grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D.C., and we can dis-
cern no reason why they should be treated any differently." Id. at 179.
67. Id. at 181-82. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), where the Court upheld
a statute which prohibited the "obstruction of or unreasonable interference with ingress and
egress to and from public buildings, including courthouses, and with traffic on the streets or
sidewalks adjacent to those buildings," id. at 622, as applied against demonstrators who had
1985]
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B. Nontraditional Sites For Expression
The importance of content neutrality in regulations of speech in a public
forum should not be underestimated. It was a major concern in Supreme
Court decisions striking down statutes that gave government authorities un-
due discretion over who may parade or speak. For example, in Chicago Po-
lice Department v. Mosley,68 the Court, on equal protection grounds,
invalidated an ordinance that allowed peaceful picketing of school grounds
by labor groups, but not by others, because it allowed or disallowed picket-
ing depending on its subject matter.69 Since the distinction between labor
and nonlabor picketing was found to be of no use in preventing disruption in
the schools, the ordinance making that distinction was disallowed."
On the same day that it struck down the school picketing ordinance in
Mosley, the Court upheld a school antinoise ordinance in Grayned v. City of
Rockford. 7 For his part in a demonstration outside a high school, Grayned
was convicted under an ordinance prohibiting willfully making noise that
would disrupt a school while that school was in session. While the ordi-
nance prohibited the same sort of activity protected in Edwards, the court
explained that here, the prohibited activity was basically incompatible with
the normal use of the property at that time of day.72 Other forms of expres-
sion which would not disrupt the school, such as peaceful picketing or
handbilling, would be allowed under the ordinance.73
maintained a picket line for two and one half months before the legislature passed the act. Id.
at 614.
68. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
69. The Court observed that "above all else, the first amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content." Id. at 95.
See Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167
(1976). There, the Court held that the commission could not restrain speech by a teacher at a
school board meeting open to the public, merely because he spoke on the teachers' pending
collective bargaining agreement but was not an authorized union representative, observing that
"[w]here the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement, it is difficult to find
justification for excluding teachers who make up the overwhelming proportion of school em-
ployees and who are most vitally concerned with the proceedings." Id. at 175.
70. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100-02. Similarly, in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), the
Court struck down a residential picketing statute for the same reasons as in Mosley, finding
that "under the guise of preserving residential privacy, Illinois has flatly prohibited all nonla-
bor picketing even though it permits labor picketing that is equally likely to intrude on the
tranquility of the home." Id. at 462.
71. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). At the same time, a Rockford ordinance that allowed labor
picketing, but not other picketing on school grounds, much like the Chicago ordinance in
Mosley, was struck down for the reasons articulated in Mosley. Id. at 107.
72. Id. at 116.
73. Id. at 119.
[Vol. 35:307
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Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 74 concerned the suspension of high
school students for wearing black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam.
The Court found that the school authorities had punished the students even
though their form of expression did not itself disrupt the school. 75 The
Court held that while activity which disrupts the classroom or invades the
rights of others would not be protected under the first amendment, 76 these
students' nondisruptive activities could not be banned merely because the
school officials might wish to avoid controversy. 7" Thus, the Court sug-
gested that even in places that are not traditional public fora for expressive
activity, the only permissible restrictions on expression are those that require
the expressive activity to conform to the normal use of the place.
This principle was demonstrated in Brown v. Louisiana.7" In that case,
Brown and four other men had been arrested for silently standing or sitting
in the reading room of the public library in Clinton, Louisiana. "They were
neither loud, boisterous, obstreperous, indecorous nor impolite, '' 79 but they
were black, and the library had been reserved for the use of white citizens.
The Court's plurality opinion recognized that the men were engaged in a
symbolic form of expression, even though they did not speak, and that such
expression is protected under the first amendment.8 0 A key factor for dis-
missal of the conviction was that while the library had never been a public
forum by custom, as had the streets in Hague, or by government action in
opening the building for expressive activity, Brown had delivered his
message by doing what one normally does in a library. He sat there si-
lently."1 Because the demonstration caused no disruption to the use of the
library, 8' regulation barring such expressive activity, here by the use of a
74. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
75. Id. at 508.
76. Id. at 513.
77. The Court held that "[i]n order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Id. at 509.
78. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
79. Id. at 139.
80. Id. at 141-42. See United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see also Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), where the Court found an act to be symbolic speech because
"[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circum-
stances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it." Id. at 410-11.
81. Justice White observed that "the behavior of these petitioners and their use of the
library building, even though it was for the purposes of a demonstration, did not depart signifi-
cantly from what normal library use would contemplate." Brown, 383 U.S. at 151 (White, J.,
concurring).
82. Id. at 140. The sheriff who arrested the five men came to the library "when he saw
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breach-of-the-peace statute, was held unconstitutional.1 3 Thus, the Court
demonstrated that the key issue is whether the government regulation in
dispute sufficiently preserves the use to which the property was dedicated.
C. Sites Designed For Expression
While the places at issue in Brown, Tinker, and other cases discussed
above were principally designed for other purposes, 4 some government
property has by designation been opened specifically for expressive purposes.
The Minnesota State fairgrounds at issue in Heffron v. International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.85 are an example of such property. Like any
other fairgrounds, they are specifically designed for expressive purposes.
86
Members of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON)
sought to engage in Sankirtan, the Krishna religious practice of selling reli-
gious literature and soliciting contributions, by roaming freely over the fair-
grounds, but the ordinances governing the use of the fairgrounds required
that all selling or distribution of literature be conducted from pre-assigned,
rented booths.87
In evaluating this restriction on expression, the Court examined the pecu-
liar necessities imposed by the nature of the fairgrounds.88 The booth regu-
lations here were found to sufficiently further the government's interest in
the orderly movement and control of the large number of people attending
the fair to justify the restriction on expression which they imposed.89 In
making this evaluation, the Court did not focus only on the extent to which
selling literature and soliciting funds by the few members of ISKCON would
affect the movement of the crowds at the fairgrounds. Instead, it recognized
that invalidating the restriction would allow any and all groups wishing to
express a religious, political, or charitable message by selling literature or
'these 5 colored males coming down the street,' " who then entered the library. Neither of the
librarians had called him. Id. at 137.
83. Id. at 142. Cf Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) (six young men arrested and
convicted of a breach of the peace for playing basketball in a public park in Savannah, Geor-
gia; the Court found the convictions violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment). Cf Garner v. Louisiana 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (students arrested and convicted of a
breach of the peace for sitting at various lunch counters in Baton Rouge, Louisana).
84. See Brown, 383 U.S. 131 (reading in a library not disrupted by silent demonstration);
Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (teaching in a school not disrupted by students wearing armbands); Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (travelling on the streets disrupted by marchers).
85. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
86. The fairgrounds are "designed to exhibit to the public an enormous variety of goods,
services, entertainment, and other matters of interest." Id. at 650.
87. Id. at 643-44.




soliciting funds to do so anywhere on the premises, causing widespread dis-
order.90 Thus, restrictions that might not be valid on the streets or in similar
areas would be valid at fairgrounds, due to the particular characteristics of
the place.9 1
The two municipal theaters at issue in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad92 were certainly places designed to accommodate expression.
93
However, the officials in control of the theaters refused to permit use of the
theaters for a production of the musical "Hair," largely because they felt the
theaters should be used for "those productions which are clean and healthful
and culturally uplifting, or words to that effect." 94 The Supreme Court held
that the theater officials had engaged in an unlawful prior restraint in re-
jecting Southeastern's application for use of the theaters. 95 The Court found
no legitimate basis related to the nature of the theaters to support the restric-
tion96 but concluded that the restriction was based on content alone.
97
In Healy v. James, 98 students who wished to form a chapter of Students
for a Democratic Society (SDS) were denied official recognition by the presi-
dent of Central Connecticut State College. That denial barred them from
90. Id. at 653. Cf Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 104 S. Ct. at 3071
(discussed supra note 52) (the Court held "that the validity of this regulation need not be
judged solely by reference to the demonstration at hand," and looked at the effect of opening
Lafayette Park for sleeping to groups other than CCNV).
91. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 651.
92. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
93. Id. at 555.
94. Id. at 549. The Federal District Court agreed, finding the show obscene. Southeast-
ern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), afl'd 486 F.2d 894 (6th
Cir. 1973).
95. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 552.
96. Id. at 555-56. See, e.g., Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2115 (1985), where the Court of Appeals disallowed the city's
ban of "hard rock" musical groups from the Starlight Bowl, as the ban was made without
reference to the degree to which those groups' audiences had caused disturbances. The city
had not allowed concerts by Blue Oyster Cult, Al Stewart, and Roxy Music as well as Todd
Rundgren (because he would attract homosexual crowds, 745 F.2d at 576), Patti Smith (be-
cause she said "off-the-wall things," id. at 577), and Jackson Browne (because he would attract
crowds opposed to nuclear power. Id.). One City Councilman had stated in a letter to a local
clergyman that "having concerts at the Starlight Bowl ... will bring to Burbank the dopers
and sexual misfits of Los Angeles into direct contact with the youths of Burbank. . . . I hope
you will also ask your fellow ministers, priests and rabbis to join with you in this morality
fight." Id. at 576 n.20. The court found that "[e]xcluding a performer because of his political
views, or those of the crowd that he might attract, or because the performer might say unor-
thodox things, as well as considering such arbitrary factors as the lifestyles or race of the
crowd that a performer would attract, is not constitutionally permissible." Id. at 577.
97. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 555-56. The Court held further that the finding
that the content was obscene, and therefore illegal, prior to the actual staging of the show was
not made "under a system with appropriate and necessary procedural safeguards." Id. at 559.
98. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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placing notices in the student newspaper; prohibited their use of campus bul-
letin boards; and denied them access to university facilities for meetings.99
The reasons for the denial included the group's affiliation with the National
SDS and objection to the group's philosophy. Other reasons articulated by
the university were the fear that the group would cause disruption on the
campus and the lack of assurances that the group would abide by university
policies.'" The Supreme Court concluded that restricting the students ex-
pression through denial of recognition l 'o could not be justified for any of the
first three reasons"0 2 and remanded the case to determine if there was any
factual basis for the fourth, the alleged lack of assurances of conformity to
university policy.
Recognizing that the university need not allow interference with the edu-
cational process, the Court found that the group could be excluded only if
there was substantial evidence that it would disrupt the campus.'0 3 But
there was no such evidence, and the university appeared to have excluded
the group merely because it was afraid, in a general sense, that the group
might be disruptive." The Court held, however, that the requirement that
groups promise, before recognition, to abide by university regulations was a
reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.'o 5 In remanding the case for
further consideration of whether the SDS had abided by such a require-
ment, 10 6 the Court allowed no greater restriction on speech than would be
necessary to preserve the normal functioning of the forum, the academic
community.
Another student group challenged its exclusion from campus facilities in
Widmar v. Vincent. 107 There, members of Cornerstone, a registered student
group, were denied the use of facilities at the University of Missouri at Kan-
sas City because they were a religious organization. The Supreme Court
99. Id. at 175-76. The students were removed from the "Devil's Den," a coffeeshop in the
Student Center, while attempting to meet to determine what to do about the rejection of recog-
nition. Id. at 176 & n.6.
100. Id. at 185-94.
101. The court found that "the organization's ability to participate in the intellectual give
and take of campus debate, and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to
the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other
students." Id. at 181-82.
102. Id. at 185.
103. Id. at 189.
104. The Court found the exclusion to be based on "little more than the sort of 'undifferen-
tiated fear or apprehension of disturbance [which] is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression.'" Id. at 191, (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
105. Healy, 408 U.S. at 192-93.
106. Id. at 194.
107. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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found that in regularly opening its facilities for use by student groups, the
university had created a public forum for expression, from which exclusions
could be made only in accord with constitutional limitations."10 The Court
recognized that a university may have legitimate reasons for excluding some
groups who could not be excluded from other fora"°9 but found this exclu-
sion, based solely on the content of the group's speech, to be unconstitu-
tional. "o In order to justify such an exclusion, the university would have to
show that it was carefully drafted in order to restrict speech no more than
was required to further a compelling state interest."' The restriction was
found not to be necessary in serving the state's interest in not promoting
religion, because providing the forum would not be a sign of state approval
of a particular religious sect." 2 Further, because the forum would be open
to a wide range of groups, both religious and secular, opening the forum
would not have the primary effect of advancing religion.' '
D. Inappropriate Sites For Expression
There are, of course, some government facilities that have not been opened
by the government for expressive purposes and which, because of their na-
ture, are not appropriate for some forms of expression. In Adderley v. Flor-
ida, "' the Court rejected the assumption that expression was con-
stitutionally protected regardless of its time, place, or manner." 5 The prop-
erty at issue in Adderley was the grounds of a county jail, where a group of
demonstrators had gathered to protest the arrest of some of their compatri-
ots. In so doing, the protestors had blocked the jail driveway and entrance,
which were restricted to official use.' 6 The demonstrators' trespass convic-
108. Id. at 267.
109. The Court observed:
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks
or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this
Court have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regulations
compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not
held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to
students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its
grounds or buildings.
Id. at 267 n.5 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 276.
111. Id. at 269-70.
112. Id. at 273-74.
113. Id. at 274-75.
114. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
115. Id. at 47-48.
116. The Court found that "[t]his particular jail entrance and driveway were not normally
used by the public, but by the sheriffs department for transporting prisoners to and from the
courts several blocks away and by commercial concerns for servicing the jail." Id. at 45.
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tions were upheld because there was no evidence that the arrests were based
on the content of the demonstrators' speech, but rather were made to pre-
vent interference with the functioning of the jail.' 17
Although a major basis of the decision in Adderley was that the jail
grounds had never been generally open to the public,"' the converse propo-
sition, that property which is generally open to the public is an appropriate
forum for expression, is not necessarily true. In Greer v. Spock, 119 regula-
tions strictly prohibiting some forms of expression1 20 within the Fort Dix
Military Reservation were upheld, despite the fact that unrestricted areas of
the base were open to civilians. 12 1 Presidential and vice-presidential candi-
dates of the People's Party and of the Socialist Workers Party had chal-
lenged those restrictions, which prevented them from campaigning on the
post. The Court, however, observed that training, not expression, was the
purpose of bases like Fort Dix 12 2 in holding that a commander could consti-
tutionally act to preserve loyalty, discipline, and morale by restricting ex-
pression on the base.
123
117. Id. at 47. The Court declared that "[t]he United States Constitution does not forbid a
State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose." Id.
at 48.
118. The Court found "no evidence at all that on any other occasion had similarly large
groups of the public been permitted to gather on this portion of the jail grounds for any pur-
pose." Id.
119. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
120. Id. at 831 & n.2.
121. Id. at 830. The Court noted that "a sign at one of the entrances says 'Visitors Wel-
come.' " Id. See id. at 871-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (photographic appendix).
122. Id. at 838.
123. Id. at 840. The Court held that "[tjhere is nothing in the Constitution that disables a
military commander from acting to avert what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty,
discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his command." Id.
In upholding Fort Dix's policy of excluding political campaigning the Court distinguished
Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972), where the Court had overturned the conviction
of an individual who had been arrested for distributing leaflets on an open street inside a
military base. There, the Court had held that because that particular street was completely
open to civilian traffic, "[u]nder such circumstances the military has abandoned any claim that
it has special interests in who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue." Id. at 198.
The candidates in Greer could be prohibited from the same act, in similar circumstances, be-
cause the authorities at Fort Dix had not abandoned such claim of special interest in expres-
sion on that base. Greer, 424 U.S. at 837.
The Court found further that although speakers whom the authorities had decided "would
be supportive of the military mission of Fort Dix," had been invited onto the base, that fact did
not create a public forum and "leave the authorities powerless thereafter to prevent any civil-
ian from entering Fort Dix to speak on any subject whatever." Id. at 838 n.10.
Similarly, in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977), the Court
allowed prison officials to restrict bulk mailing and meetings by prisoners who wished to form
a union, although both the Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous had been allowed such privi-
leges. The Court held that the prison officials "need only demonstrate a rational basis for their
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A consistent policy of exclusion was a major basis for the Court's decision
in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 124 where the Court upheld a city's ban
on political advertising on car cards in its public transit system. The total
exclusion of all political advertising 125 supported the Court's finding that
rather than creating a public forum, the city was engaging in commerce by
providing transportation for its residents.126 The restriction on political ad-
vertising was merely incidental to that effort.' 27 A second justification for
the city's restrictions on the advertising that it accepted for the public transit
system was the protection of the sensibilities of its users, who, as a captive
audience, would have little choice but to be subjected to the advertise-
ments. 128 Thus, the Court allowed the city to preserve the transit system for
its intended purpose, and not for the expression of political opinion. 129
Expressions of political opinion are found in mailboxes all the time.13°
Federal law, however, limits access to the boxes to material on which post-
age has been paid.' 3 ' In U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Assocations, 132 local civic groups challenged this restriction on their ability
to distribute messages and pamphlets. The Court rejected this challenge and
distinctions between organizational groups." Id. at 134. The Court accepted the prison offi-
cials basis for distinguishing the union from the Jaycees and AA, id. at 134 n. 10, finding that
both groups, but not the union, "were seen as serving a rehabilitative purpose, working in
harmony with the goals and desires of the prison administrators, and both had been deter-
mined not to pose any threat to the order or security of the institution." Id. at 134.
124. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
125. The Court found "uncontradicted testimony at the trial that during the 26 years of
public operation, the Shaker Heights system, pursuant to city council action, had not accepted
or permitted any political or public issue advertising on its vehicles." Id. at 300-01.
126. Id. at 303.
127. Id. The Court explained that the restriction could be justified because:
Revenue earned from long-term commercial advertising could be jeopardized by a
requirement that short-term candidacy or issue-oriented advertisements be displayed
on car cards. Users would be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. There
could be lurking doubts about favoritism, and sticky administrative problems might
arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians.
Id. at 304.
128. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring). But see Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980). There the Court found that Edison customers receiving a
message with their bill could "escape exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring
the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket." Id. at 542. Cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (passersby could avoid allegedly offensive words by averting their eyes).
129. The Court explained that "[w]ere we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public
hospitals, libraries, office buildings, military compounds, and other public facilities immedi-
ately would become Hyde Parks open to every would-be pamphleteer and politician. This the
Constitution does not require. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
130. See L. SAnATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING
ELECTIONS 220-63 (1981).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1725 (1969) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1725 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
132. 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
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found that the restriction protected Postal Service revenues, prevented over-
crowding of the boxes, promoted the privacy of the mails, and aided in the
investigation of mail theft.' 33 These restrictions were all part of an effort to
preserve the boxes for their intended purpose and to ensure efficient delivery
of the mail. Thus, while a person may use the mails for delivery of almost
any message he wishes, the Post Office may still limit access to the system to
those messages bearing the proper postage. 
1 34
Access to a school district's internal mail system was sought in Perry Edu-
cation Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association. 135 The system was
used primarily to send messages to and among the teachers,136 but the sys-
tem had also been used by private organizations not directly connected to
the school, such as the YMCA and Cub Scouts.137 Access also was provided
to the union that exclusively represented the teachers, but not to rival un-
ions.' 3 8 A rival union, which had previously been allowed access to the sys-
tem, challenged this restriction, claiming that the system constituted a
limited public forum from which it could not be excluded. After explaining
the characteristics of various types of fora,'3 9 the Court found that the
school mail system was not a limited public forum, as it was not open to the
general public.'4 ° The Court held further that even if the mail system had
become a limited public forum, access could still be limited to groups which
were similar. 4 ' The facilities might be open to groups like those that had
previously been allowed access, but not to a group like the rival union.' 4 2
Although the rival union had previously been allowed access, that access
was allowed because at the time it used the system in its capacity of repre-
senting the teachers. 4 3 The union's status had changed, however, when the
other union became the exclusive representative of the teachers. This change
in status justified its exclusion, as the representative union would now have
133. Id. at 117-18.
134. The Court found that "it is a giant leap from the traditional 'soapbox' to the letterbox
designated as an authorized depository of the United States mails, and we do not believe the
First Amendment requires us to make that leap." Id. at 131.
135. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
136. Id. at 39.
137. Id. at 39 & n.2.
138. Id. at 40.
139. See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
140. 460 U.S. at 46-47.
141. Id. at 48.
142. Id. The facilities might be open to "the Girl Scouts, the local boys' club, and other
organizations that engage in activities of interest and educational relevance to students, [but]
they would not as a consequence be open to an organization such as PLEA [the rival union],




exclusive responsibility for representing the interests of the teachers."' The
Court reiterated that use of a property may be restricted to its official
business. 145
Each of the cases discussed above demonstrates the principle that regard-
less of the category of forum involved, the only legitimate concern the gov-
ernment may advance as justification for restrictions on expression in that
forum is to preserve that particular property for its normal use.' 4 6 Previous
government action regarding expression may be helpful in determining the
normal use of the property, 147 but it is not conclusive. Neither the library in
Brown nor the jail grounds in Adderley had ever been opened by the govern-
ment for expressive purposes. Still, expression was allowed in one place but
not in the other, not because the government had condoned it there but be-
cause the expression was compatible with the place. To evaluate the scope of
permissible expression in a place by the government's degree of acquiescence
to that expression, rather than by the necessities imposed by the particular
characteristics of the place, is to assume that first amendment rights are be-
stowed not by the Constitution but by the government. While the Supreme
Court's 1897 decision in Davis v. Massachusetts4 8 might support such an
assumption, the Court's application of forum analysis over the intervening
ninety years most certainly does not. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
& Education Fund, " however, the Court departed from the manner in
144. Id. at 51-52. The exclusion was also justified as "a means of insuring [sic] labor peace
within the schools." Id. at 52 & n.12.
145. The Court explained that "[a]s we have already stressed, when government property is
not dedicated to open communication the government may-without further justification-
restrict use to those who participate in the forum's official business." Id. at 53 & n. 13.
146. The Court expressed this principle in Hague, 307 U.S. at 496, (discussed supra notes
36-40 and accompanying text) when it held:
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for commu-
nication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16.
147. For example, in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 (discussed supra notes 107-13 and accompa-
nying text), the Court recognized that the university had opened its facilities for student
groups in order to further education. In Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303 (discussed supra notes 124-
29 and accompanying text), the total exclusion of all political advertising supported the finding
that the car cards were part of a commercial venture, rather than a political forum. In Perry,
460 U.S. at 48 (discussed supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text), opening the school mail
system only to those private groups that provided educational activities to students supported
the contention that use of the system was limited to official business.
148. 167 U.S. at 47 (discussed supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text).
149. 105 S. Ct. at 3439.
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which it had applied forum analysis, suggesting the renewed validity of the
principles expressed in Davis.
II. APPLICATION OF FORUM ANALYSIS TO THE COMBINED FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN
The forum at issue in Cornelius was the Combined Federal Campaign.
The CFC is a fund-raising drive conducted each year among federal work-
ers. Workers may make undesignated contributions to the fund which are
then divided among participating organizations, or they may designate that
their contributions go specifically to one or more of the participating organi-
zations.15° Funds are solicited through an informational leaflet distributed
to federal workers, in which each participating organization may place a
thirty-word statement describing its activities.t'5 In the first of three cases
involving the legal defense funds' (LDFs) participation in the campaign,
NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund v. Campbell, 152 the district court
found that the CFC was a government-sponsored means of communicating
with federal workers.
1 53
In that case, the district court found the then applicable "direct services"
requirement on participation in the CFC to be too vague to justify exclusion
of the LDFs and thus unconstitutional.' 54 Following that case, Donald De-
vine, Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the agency responsi-
150. See NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. Devine, 727 F.2d 1247, 1249-50 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
151. Id. at 1250.
152. 504 F. Supp. 1365 (D.D.C. 1981).
153. The district court held that "by providing organizations the opportunity to participate
in the CFC, the government has, in effect, provided a billboard or channel of communication
through which organizations can disseminate their appeals to federal workers." Id. at 1367.
154. Id. at 1368. The government had asserted that the LDFs did not provide "direct
services to persons in the fields of health and welfare services," as required by the CFC regula-
tions, "but rather serve as advocates for groups." Id. at 1366. However, the court noted:
Plaintiffs argue at length that they do provide "direct services" in a variety of
ways. The record is replete with the results of plaintiffs' work, indicating that law
suits by plaintiffs have provided millions of dollars in back pay and benefits, and
invaluable other "services" such as increased training opportunities, additional pro-
motions, improved school programs, and better hospital facilities. Apart from their
litigation activities, each plaintiff also provides "direct services" through scholarship
programs and education efforts. Given defendant's failure adequately to define the
"direct services" requirement, it is impossible for plaintiffs to know how to conform
their activities to meet that requirement short of becoming a public defender or legal
aid society.
Id. at 1368.
In a second case, NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. Devine, (NAACP 11), 560 F.
Supp. 667 (D.D.C. 1983), the LDF's challenge to the guidelines by which undesignated CFC
revenues were distributed was rejected.
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ble for administering the CFC, sought to amend the regulations in order to
exclude the LDFs. '" The result of his efforts was an executive order which
further defined "direct services" and which ordered that advocacy groups be
excluded.156 Because those new guidelines would exclude them from the
campaign, the LDFs brought a challenge to their enforcement that eventu-
ally reached the Supreme Court in Cornelius.
On motion for summary judgement, the district court ruled that the gov-
ernment could not deny the LDFs access to the campaign for the solicitation
of designated payments.1 57 The court found that solicitation of funds is
speech protected by the first amendment1 58 and that organizations partici-
pating in the campaign were appealing to federal workers for support.' 5 9
However, that persuasive effort, conducted entirely through a thirty-word
statement in the campaign leaflet, was found only to apply to solicitation of
designated contributions." Undesignated contributions were found not to
be made in response to any particular plea. Rather, an employee who makes
such a contribution is simply giving to charity in general.' 6 ' Finding that
the CFC was a public forum in its limited context, 162 the court rejected the
government's reasons for exclusion.'
63
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision regarding the
solicitation of designated contributions.' 64 The court did not decide what
sort of forum the CFC constituted, finding that even if it was the sort of
nonpublic forum found in Perry, the government's reasons for distinguishing
LDFs from other groups were not reasonable.
65
155. See NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. Devine, 727 F.2d at 1251-53.
156. The order decreed that "[a]gencies that seek to influence the outcomes of elections or
the determination of public policy through political activity or advocacy, lobbying, or litiga-
tion on behalf of parties other than themselves shall not be deemed . . . eligible to participate
... " Exec. Order No. 12,404, 3 C.F.R. 151 (1984). See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963). There, the Court found restrictions imposed by Virginia on the NAACP's solicitation
of potential civil rights litigants to be unconstitutional. The Court noted: "In the context of
NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means
for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state,
and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. Id. at 429.
157. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. Devine, (NAACP II1), 567 F. Supp. 401
(D.D.C. 1983).
158. Id. at 406. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 620.
159. NAACP III, 567 F. Supp. at 406.
160. Id.
161. Id. See NAACP II, 560 F. Supp. at 675.
162. NAACP III, 567 F. Supp. at 406.
163. Id. at 409.
164. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. Devine, 727 F.2d at 1247. The district
court's dismissal of the LDFs' claim regarding undesignated funds was not appealed. Id. at
1254.
165. The court found that the government's assertion that the "exclusion of LDFs is a
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On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court,
Justice O'Connor found that solicitation of funds is protected by the first
amendment. 166 She then defined the forum at issue to be the CFC and its
literature, rather than the federal workplace, because the LDFs had sought
access only to the CFC, not to the federal workplace as a whole. 167 Still, the
character of the federal workplace remained a factor in the analysis. 68
The Court then determined whether the relevant forum was public or
nonpublic in nature.169 The Court held that a public forum came into exist-
ence in one of only two ways: traditional use, as in Hague, 170 or through
government creation.' 7' Finding that the government only creates a public
forum when it intends to do SO,1 72 the Court examined ways to determine
the government's intent. 173 Using the government's intent as its basis for
evaluation, the Court found that the CFC was a nonpublic forum, as its
purpose was to limit expressive activities in order to prevent disruption. 
7
The Court supported its finding that the CFC was a nonpublic forum by
recognizing the government's power to limit access to the federal
critical means of restricting participation in the CFC to 'those charities which assist those who
are most in need,'" to be "patently ludicrous in view of the wide range of organizations in-
cluded in the CFC," including the United States Olympic Committee, and many others. Id. at
1259 (emphasis added).
The court found further that the LDFs better served the purpose of the CFC, as asserted by
the government, than many groups which would remain, because through the LDFs' litigation
efforts, "hundreds of thousands of persons have received direct benefits, such as income sup-
plementation in the form of back pay and future earning, better educations, improved health
care, better housing and other living conditions, humane conditions of incarceration and, in
the case of [its] capital punishment program, life itself." Id. at 1260 (quoting Affidavit of Jack
Greenberg, Director-Counsel of the NAACP, at 6 (Nov. 25, 1980).
166. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3447. See supra note 9.
167. Id. at 3448-49.
168. Id. at 3449.
169. Id. at 3449-51.
170. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
171. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3449.
172. The Court found that "It]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or
by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a non-traditional forum for
public discourse." Id. Contra Flowers v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972) (where the Court
found that the commander of a military base had "abandoned any claim [of] special interest in
who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue").
173. The Court said it "has looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascer-
tain whether [the government] intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly
and debate as a public forum," and that it "has also examined the nature of the property and
its compatibility with expressive activity to discern the governments intent." 105 S. Ct. at 3449
(emphasis added).
174. The Court found that "[t]he historical background indicates that the Campaign was
designed to minimize the disruption to the workplace that had resulted from unlimited ad hoc
solicitation activities by lessening the amount of expressive activity occurring on federal prop-




Having defined the CFC as a nonpublic forum, the Court defined the pa-
rameters of government restrictions on speech in that type of forum. Reiter-
ating the teaching of Perry,'76 the Court held that speaker and subject
matter distinctions are permissible in a nonpublic forum, as long as those
distinctions are justified by the nature of the forum and are viewpoint neu-
tral.' 7 7 The Court then held that because it is a nonpublic forum, judicial
evaluations of those justifications need not be as exacting as in other types of
fora. 1
78
The government managed to overcome these constitutional obstacles, as
the Court accepted its justifications for excluding the LDFs': the President
could find that direct aid, rather than litigation, best served charitable
goals; 179 the government could reasonably wish to avoid the appearance of
175. Id. The Court had earlier defined the forum at issue as the CFC, not the federal
workplace. Id. at 3448-49.
176. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
177. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3451.
178. The Court held:
The Government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be rea-
sonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation. In
contrast to a public forum, a finding of strict incompatibility between the nature of
the speech or the identity of the speaker and the functioning of the nonpublic forum
is not mandated. . . . Nor is there a requirement that the restriction be narrowly
tailored or that the Government's interest be compelling.
Id. at 3453 (emphasis in original).
179. The Court observed that "[h]ere the President could reasonably conclude that a dollar
directly spent on providing food or shelter to the needy is more beneficial than a dollar spent
on litigation that might or might not result in aid to the needy." Id. But see id. at 3463 n.5
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) where he notes:
During the 1981-1982 Campaign year, groups allowed to participate in the CFC
for the National Capital Area included Close-up, "An alternative means of political
education structured to teach high school students about government while provid-
ing opportunities for involvement to aid in deciding political futures;" The Rep, In-
corporated, which "Provides a forum for training and educating writers, actors,
theatrical directors and other theater craftsmen;" African Heritage Dancers and
Drummers, "A community arts organization designed to give students and area resi-
dents a greater appreciation of traditional African arts, dance and music;" D.C.
Striders, "An organization of promising high school athletes which provides struc-
tured programs for field and track competitors;" the District of Columbia Music
Center, which "Provides the opportunity for understanding and appreciation of the
Fine Arts through study and performance;" and the Howard Theater Foundation,
which "Preserves the cultural legacy of the Howard Theater." Those groups may
well provide most worthwhile services, but their inclusion in the CFC is difficult to
square with the Government's purported conclusion that charitable contributions are
best spent providing food or shelter to the needy. [The Government] would explain
all these inconsistencies by saying that at times it may have misapplied its own eligi-
bility criteria. . . . If the Government is truly concerned that money be spent di-
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political favoritism; °80 the government could wish to avoid controversy
which might disrupt the federal workplace;' and the government could
reasonably wish to exclude organizations whose presence might endanger
the success of the campaign.' 82 The Court, however, did find reason to sus-
pect that bias may have affected the decision to exclude the LDFs'83 and
allowed the LDFs to pursue, on remand, the allegation that the Reagan ad-
ministration had excluded them from the CFC because the administration
disagreed with their viewpoints.184
In dissent, Justice Blackmun complained that the Court had failed to
properly evaluate the relationship between the forum and the type of expres-
sion in question. In his view, the proper approach would be to balance the
conflicting interests before labelling the property at issue as a particular type
of forum, as that labelling could be conclusive of the question when, as in
Cornelius, it dictates the sort of analysis that will then be undertaken.
18 5
Additionally, he complained that previous restrictions should not determine
the permissibility of expression in a particular forum, but that compatibility
of expression with the intended use of the property should be examined inde-
rectly on food and shelter for the needy, it is strange that it could have misapplied its
criteria almost 75% of the time.
180. Id. at 3453. See NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. Devine, 727 F.2d at 1262
(quoting Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Devine, No. 83-2118 (D.D.C. Sept. 14,
1983)): "Everyone knows where I [Director Devine] stand in regard to the kind of practices
that Planned Parenthood does. You promote abortions; I think that's detestible (sic). I think
in a just world you'd have nothing to do with a charitable drive." Contrary to Director De-
vine's wishes, Planned Parenthood was included. Id. at 3-4. See also 727 F.2d at 1264, where
the Court of Appeals noted that "participation by the Moral Majority Foundation, Inc., was
allowed even though its activities include providing educational services with respect to abor-
tion counseling. One can hardly envision decisions more likely to lead to outcries of
'politicization'...." Id.
181. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3453. But see id. at 3467 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Expres-
sions of affection for the Dallas Cowboys would surely be forbidden in all federal offices lo-
cated in the District of Columbia if the avoidance-of-controversy rationale were valid.").
182. Id. at 3453-54. This rationale is undermined by the LDFs' assertion that "the alleged
controversy has had no discernible impact upon the success of the Campaign. Contributions
have increased every year that legal defense funds have participated .... " Brief for Respon-
dents at 34-35 & n.44, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439
(1985).
183. 105 S. Ct. at 3454-55.
184. Id.
185. Justice Blackmun complained that "[r]ather than taking the nature of the property
into account in balancing the first amendment interests of the speaker and society's interests in
freedom of speech against the interests served by reserving the property to its normal use, the




pendently." s6 In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens questioned
the value of forum analysis, as applied here, to the decisional process.187 He
would have found that because the LDFs sought only to receive designated
contributions, which reflect the choice of the individual donor, none of the
government's justifications for exclusion were valid."88
The Court's opinion in Cornelius departs from its earlier decisions.' 89 In
those cases, the Court made a straight-forward evaluation of the way in
which a particular manner of expression would affect a particular forum.' 90
Certain restrictions on speech or distinctions between speakers were allowed
because the nature of the forum dictated that they be allowed.' 9' In these
earlier cases the Court often described the disputed site of expression as one
of the three types of fora to demonstrate its similarity to other sites where
the Court's evaluation had reached a similar result.' 92 In Cornelius, how-
ever, the Court has placed the site in a category and allowed that artificially
imposed designation to dictate its standard of scrutiny. With its intensity of
examination thus relaxed, the Court accepted justifications for restrictions
which it otherwise would have rejected.' 93
186. Justice Blackmun asserted that "[t]he guarantees of the first amendment should not
turn entirely on either an accident of history or the grace of the Government." Id. at 3460.
187. Id. at 3466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 3466-67.
189. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 (discussed supra notes 74-77 and accompanying
text); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263 (discussed supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text); Chicago
Police Dep't, 408 U.S. at 92 (discussed supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text).
190. See, e.g., Heffron, 452 U.S. at 640 (discussed supra notes 85-91 and accompanying
text); Greer, 424 U.S. at 828 (discussed supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text).
191. See supra note 190.
192. Justice Blackmun explained that "[tihus, the public forum, limited public forum, and
nonpublic forum categories are but analytical shorthand for the principles that have guided the
Court's decisions regarding claims to access to public property for expressive activity." Corne-
lius, 105 S. Ct. at 3459 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193. The Court's acceptance of the President's preference for direct aid to the needy over
aid through litigation as justification for exclusion of the LDFs is curious in light of the partici-
pation of various groups that do not provide such aid. See supra note 179. Further, the CFC
is designed to reflect the preference of the individual donor by allowing him to designate his
contribution for a specific group. See Cornelius 105 S. Ct. at 3466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Avoidance of the appearance of favoritism was rejected as a justification for exclusion of a
group in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75 (discussed supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text).
There, the Court found that the wide variety of groups granted access precluded any inference
of favoritism. Id.
In Cornelius, a 30-word request for contributions was found too controversial for the federal
worker, while opposition to the Vietman War was found not to be too controversial for high
school students in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 (discussed supra notes 74-77 and accompanying
text). In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, (1949), Justice Douglas took a dim view of con-
troversiality as a justification for silencing speakers. He declared:
(A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
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Different standards of review are not without precedent.' 94 But here, be-
cause the Court categorizes a place as a particular type of forum by reference
to the restrictions on expression the government intended for that place, the
Court allows the government to set its own standard of review. Thus, a
circular pattern emerges. The government decides to restrict expression in a
place. The Court, seeing that the government intended to restrict expression
there, categorizes the place as a type of forum according to the degree of
restriction the government intended. The type of forum then dictates the
standard of review with the degree of scrutiny varying inversely with the
degree of restriction. When the restriction is challenged, the Court, with an
appropriately relaxed examination, accepts the government's justifications,
thereby validating the restrictions. Thus, the government is permitted a re-
striction because the government intended that restriction.
This deference to the government's intent is inconsistent with the history
of first amendment jurisprudence, which is, by its nature, made up of cases
in which the government intended to restrict an individual's expression. In
Hague, the government intended to keep the CIO out of Jersey City. In
Heffron, the government intended to keep Hare Krishnas out of the
broadways at the fairgrounds. In Southeastern Promotions, the government
intended to keep "Hair" out of its theaters. In Greenburgh, the government
intended to keep unstamped mail out of mailboxes. And in Brown, the gov-
ernment intended to keep black people out of the public library. The gov-
ernment's success or failure on review depended not on its intent, but on the
degree to which its restrictions were justified by the nature of the forum.
Under the analysis used in those and other cases, the government in Corne-
lius might not have succeeded in its attempt to keep the legal defense funds
out of the Combined Federal Campaign.
III. CONCLUSION
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, the Supreme
Court held that the government could constitutionally deny several legal de-
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is
why freedom of speech, though not absolute, . . . is nevertheless protected against
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest. . . . There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view.
For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures,
courts, or dominant political or community groups.
Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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fense funds access to charitable solicitation through the Combined Federal
Campaign. The Court found the government's justifications for exclusion to
be reasonable in preserving the CFC for its designated purpose, nondisrup-
tive solicitation of contributions in the federal workplace by groups the gov-
ernment described as traditional charities.
The major effect of Cornelius has been to transform the descriptive forum
analysis dicta of Perry into a constitutional test. Labels which had previ-
ously been descriptive have become prescriptive, all but determining the re-
sult the Court will reach. Because these labels are applied largely on the
basis of the Court's perception of the government's intent, that intent has
become self-fulfilling. Motivation becomes justification, without regard to
the constraints imposed by the first amendment. Cornelius implies that now
the government may be permitted to control its property as would a private
individual, who, unlike the government, had never owed a constitutional
duty to respect the freedom of speech. Such an implication is disheartening
to those who believe that the Constitution, not the government, should de-
termine the rights to which an individual is entitled.
John V Snyder

